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THE SCOTTISH CRIMINAL JURY: A VERY
PECULIAR INSTITUTION
PETER DUFF*
I
INTRODUCTION
One of the benefits of the comparative study of legal institutions is that it
exposes the extent to which they are shaped by contingency as well as by logic
or principle. What is regarded in one jurisdiction as the only possible or acceptable way of doing something is often revealed to be pure preconception. In
other words, the comparative study of law can act as a balance to the unconscious ethnocentrism often displayed in legal and political ideology. For this
reason, the Scottish criminal jury is of particular interest because it embodies
several unique characteristics which might seem very peculiar to those familiar
with other versions of the institution. In particular, it comprises fifteen persons; its verdicts may be reached on the basis of a bare eight-seven majority;
and it has a choice between three different verdicts—guilty, not guilty, and not
proven—which even many Scots regard as illogical and unprincipled. The main
purpose of this article is to describe and discuss the Scottish criminal jury. I
shall also use the above peculiarities and other aspects of the institution to
question various assumptions commonly held elsewhere about trial by jury.
II
ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND
While the exact origins of the Scottish criminal jury are obscure, it is clear
that it developed roughly in tandem with, although in a different fashion from,
1
its English counterpart. It is thought to have derived from the Norman style of
government which began to permeate Scotland in the eleventh and twelfth cen2
turies, although it is likely that there was already some form of community par3
ticipation in different forums for resolving disputes. In succeeding centuries,
other possible methods of settling conflicts, such as trial by ordeal, trial by
combat, and trial by compurgation, died out and trial by jury became more
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20-30 (1966). This also summarises the English literature on the subject.
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3. See id. at 5.
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4

common. Initially, jurors were selected for their knowledge of the circumstances of the case, but by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a distinction began to emerge between jurors and witnesses. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Baron Hume, regarded as the founder of modern Scottish
criminal law, was able to state that jurors had long sat solely in a judicial capac5
ity.
6
The Scottish civil jury has a less interesting history. Unlike the criminal
jury, it did not emerge spontaneously. While it may have existed in embryonic
form in Scottish civil procedure, the modern version was adopted from England
in 1815 and consequently possesses none of the peculiarities of its criminal
7
counterpart. Instead, it is comprised of twelve persons, whose decision origi8
nally had to be unanimous but may now be reached by majority, with the normal choice of two verdicts. As elsewhere, the use of the civil jury has declined
rapidly in recent years, and it was recently observed that many legal practitio9
ners now regard it as a “somewhat exotic creature.” Its use in the Sheriff
10
Court, the lower of the civil courts, was abolished in 1980. In the higher civil
court, the Court of Session, some cases are in theory still tried by jury, most no11
tably actions for damages for personal injuries and for defamation. In practice, however, there is trial by judge if the parties consent or if “special cause”
12
is shown. If an action involves complicated questions of law or difficult calculations of damages, this will usually be considered to be sufficiently “special”
13
to justify dispensing with the jury. As a consequence of these two exceptions,
the number of civil cases heard before a jury each year does not reach double
14
figures. Thus, the rest of this article is concerned with the jury in criminal
cases.
III
THE INCIDENCE OF JURY TRIAL
At the outset, it is necessary to explain the hierarchy formed by the Scottish
criminal courts of first instance: the High Court of Justiciary; the Sheriff Court
4. See id. at 21-30.
5. See id. at 197.
6. See id. at 247-57 (discussing the development of the Scottish civil jury).
7. See id. at 256.
8. See Administration of Justice Act § 11(1) (1933) (Scot.). The majority verdict was not introduced to civil procedure until 1933. See id.
9. Mark Lazarowicz, Excessive Damages and Civil Jury Trial, SCOTS LAW TIMES (NEWS) 1996, at
251-56.
10. See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, § 11 (1980) (Scot.).
11. See Court of Session Act § 11 (1988) (Scot.). Section 11 replaced its outdated counterpart in
the Court of Session Act § 11 (1825) (Scot.), and removed from the ambit of jury trial a large number
of types of action which never in practice went to a jury.
12. See id. § 9.
13. See, e.g., Stark v. Ford, 1995 S.L.T. 69, 70 (Outer House).
14. See Civil Juries: Abolition?, SCOTS LAW TIMES (NEWS) 1988, at 212; see also ALAN PETERSON
& T. ST. JOHN BATES, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF SCOTLAND 33, 43 (3d ed. 1993); Lazarowicz, supra
note 9.
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sitting under “solemn” procedure (that is, with a jury); the Sheriff Court sitting
15
under “summary” procedure (that is, without a jury); and the District Court.
The High Court comprises around twenty-five judges who act as the ultimate
tribunal for criminal appeals and also form the highest civil court of first instance (the Court of Session). Criminal trials in the High Court are always
heard under solemn procedure by one judge sitting with a jury. The court sits
in Edinburgh but goes on circuit as required to the other main towns in Scotland. Its powers of sentencing are unlimited.
At the next level, Scotland is divided into forty-nine sheriffdoms, each of
which has a sheriff court with one or more sheriffs attached to it depending
16
upon the volume of business. For example, the Glasgow Sheriff Court has
more than twenty sheriffs, whereas the sheriff courts in Orkney and Shetland
share one sheriff. Sheriffs, who have both civil and criminal jurisdiction, are
appointed from the ranks of long-standing legal practitioners. In criminal matters, sheriffs have a dual jurisdiction. Under solemn procedure, the sheriff sits
with a jury and the maximum sentence he may impose is three years’ imprisonment; under summary procedure, the sheriff sits alone, and the maximum
sentences available are three months, or six months in the case of a second or
17
subsequent offence of theft or violence, or a fine of £5,000. Finally, there are
district courts throughout Scotland where minor criminal cases are heard under
summary procedure before one or often more lay justices of the peace. The
maximum penalties available to the district court are sixty days’ imprisonment
or a fine of £2,500.
As in most other jurisdictions, the vast bulk of cases are processed through
the lower criminal courts. Of all the criminal cases dealt with by the Scottish
courts in the year up to March 31, 1995, only 2.2% were heard under solemn
18
procedure and thus offered even the possibility of trial by jury. Again, as
elsewhere, most accused tend to plead guilty, and only one-third of those sol19
emn cases result in a trial. Thus, of all those persons prosecuted in the Scot20
tish criminal courts in 1994-95, fewer than one percent put their case to a jury.
In fairness, it should be noted that because of the greater propensity of those
prosecuted under summary procedure to plead guilty, jury trials comprised
21
7.7% of all trials in Scotland during that period. Nevertheless, this still means
15. See generally ROBERT WEMYSS RENTON & HENRY HILTON BROWN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
¶¶ 1-08 to 1-10, 1-17 (6th ed. 1996), for a full account of the jurisdiction and powers of the Scottish
criminal courts. This is the “bible” for Scots criminal lawyers and will frequently be referred to
throughout this article.
16. See generally id.
17. See Crime and Punishment Act § 13 (1997) (Scot.). Though not yet implemented, the Act increases these maxima to five years’ imprisonment under solemn procedure and six months (or 12
months in the case of a subsequent offence of theft or violence) under summary procedure.
18. See 1994-95 HER MAJESTY’S SCOTTISH OFFICE, CROWN OFFICE AND PROCURATOR FISCAL
SERV. ANN. REP. 46; see also 1996-97 HER MAJESTY’S SCOTTISH OFFICE, CROWN OFFICE AND
PROCURATOR FISCAL SERV. ANN. REP. 41 [hereinafter collectively CROWN OFFICE REPORTS].
19. See CROWN OFFICE REPORTS, supra note 18.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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that 92.3% percent of contested cases were heard either by a sheriff sitting
22
alone or by lay magistrates. Further, one cannot escape the fact that fewer
than one in a hundred of all persons accused of crime in Scotland have their
23
fate determined by a jury, an astonishingly low proportion given the significance invested in trial by jury and the confidence in the criminal justice system
which the institution generates.
A. Jurisdiction
There are very few crimes which may not be prosecuted under summary
procedure. The High Court, where procedure is solemn, has exclusive jurisdiction over the common law crimes of murder and rape (as well as over treason
and some other extremely rare offences); thus, those accused of such crimes are
24
always entitled to trial by jury. All other common law crimes, including assault, robbery, burglary, theft, and fraud, may be tried under either solemn or
25
summary procedure and thus need not necessarily be heard before a jury. For
statutory crimes, the relevant legislation sometimes specifies the mode of trial,
but very few offences demand solemn procedure. Examples of statutory offences requiring solemn procedure are breaches of the Official Secrets Acts,
some terrorist offences and, most commonly, the crime of causing death by
26
dangerous driving. However, the great majority of statutory crimes may be
prosecuted only under summary procedure, and thus a jury can never be in27
volved in such cases. Finally, some statutory offences—like most common law
28
offences—may be heard under either summary or solemn procedure.
Where a crime may be tried under either solemn or summary procedure, it
29
is the public prosecutor who decides upon the mode of trial. At this stage, it
should be noted that Scotland has a long-standing tradition of the public prose30
cution of crime. Great importance has always been attached to the independence of the Scottish prosecution service and the fact that it is unaccountable to
31
the police, the courts, the victims of crime, or the accused. In each and every
32
case, the public prosecutor is “master of the instance,” which means that it is
entirely up to the prosecution whether to prosecute at all, what charges to

22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶¶ 1-08 to 1-10, 1-17.
25. See id.
26. See Official Secrets Acts § 10 (1911, 1989) (Scot.); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, § 13 (1989); Road Traffic Act § 1 (1989) (Scot.); Road Traffic Offenders Act § 9, sched. 2
(1988) (Scot.).
27. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶¶ 1-08 to 1-10, 1-17.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See SUSAN R. MOODY & JACQUELINE TOMBS, PROSECUTION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 18-22
(1982); see also JULIA FIONDA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY
65-95 (1995).
31. See MOODY & TOMBS, supra note 30, at 18-22; RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 3.06.
32. MOODY & TOMBS, supra note 30, at 18-22; RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 3.06.
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bring, where to proceed, what procedure to use, and whether to accept a plea
33
bargain. In determining the appropriate venue and whether to prosecute under solemn or summary procedure, the main factor taken into account by the
prosecutor is the adequacy of the sentencing power of the court in light of the
34
seriousness of the crime. For example, a minor assault, resulting in a black
eye for the victim, will almost certainly be prosecuted either in the district
court, where the maximum penalty is sixty days’ imprisonment, or in the sheriff
court under summary procedure, where the maximum penalty is three months.
Thus, such cases will not be heard before a jury. On the other hand, a serious
assault with a weapon, resulting in severe injuries, will probably be prosecuted
before a jury either in the sheriff court under solemn procedure, where the
maximum penalty is three years, or the High Court, with its unlimited sentencing power. In this context, it should be noted that recent legislation, not yet activated, enables the sheriff’s current sentencing powers under summary proce35
dure to be doubled. The effect of this is likely to be a further decrease in the
number of jury trials.
In Scotland, if a case may be heard under either solemn or summary proce36
dure, the accused has no say in the matter. This is unlike England and Wales,
where, at least with respect to the large number of “either-way” crimes, it is the
defendant, and not the prosecutor, who decides whether the case will be tried
37
in the Crown Court before a jury or in the Magistrates Court without a jury.
In the interests of efficiency and the reduction of costs, there have been several
attempts in England and Wales to limit the defendant’s “right” to opt for jury
trial by making various “either-way” offences, primarily petty dishonesty and
minor violence, triable only under summary procedure. However, these proposals have been criticised as an attack on citizens’ civil liberties and contrary
38
to due process. In Scotland, on the other hand, the accused has never had any
such “right,” and perhaps more significantly, there has never been any pressure
39
to grant the accused such an option. Thus, what in England is often perceived
to be a fundamental principle of trial by jury is revealed simply to be the product of the way in which the institution happened to develop in that jurisdiction.

33. See MOODY & TOMBS, supra note 30, at 18-22; RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 3.06.
34. See MOODY & TOMBS, supra note 30, at 18-22; RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 3.06.
35. The Crime and Punishment Act § 13 (1997) (Scot.), increases the previous maxima of three
and six months to six and 12 months.
36. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: AN EVALUATIVE STUDY 247-48 (1994).
37. See Nicholas Blake, The Case for the Jury, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK 141 (Mark Findlay &
Peter Duff eds., 1988).
38. See id. at 145-46; see also John Jackson, Trial by Jury and Alternative Modes of Trial, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 255-63 (Mike McConville & Lee Bridges eds., 1994); Gerry Maher, Reforming the Criminal Process: A Scottish Perspective, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra, at 62-65.
For analysis of this issue, see ASHWORTH, supra note 36, at 242-52.
39. See THOMSON COMMITTEE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND, SECOND REPORT, Cmnd.
6218, ¶¶ 51.46-.47 (1975).
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Unlike some jurisdictions, there has been very little pressure in Scotland to
40
curtail the role of the jury in cases involving complex commercial crime. The
prosecutor can always avoid jury trial, of course, by choosing to proceed under
summary procedure in the Sheriff Court, but in that case the maximum penalty
which can be imposed is only three months’ imprisonment (or six months for a
second offence) and a fine of £5,000. Various suggestions to modify or remove
the jury from complicated fraud trials were considered by the Thomson Committee in the 1970s, largely because there was concern in England over the is41
sue. Nonetheless, these proposals were rejected by the majority of respon42
dents to the enquiry and found little favour with the Committee itself. In a
recent review of trial by jury conducted by the Scottish Office, the question of
43
juror comprehension was briefly touched upon, but there was little concern
that this posed a particular problem and there were no proposals for change as
44
regards this issue. This review did not even mention the trial of complex
commercial crime, largely because such cases have simply not proved to be a
problem in Scotland. It should be noted however, that Scotland has not yet had
any long and complex prosecutions of large-scale commercial frauds of the sort
that have caused difficulties in other jurisdictions.
B. Citing and Empanelling the Jury
In Scotland, every person aged between eighteen and sixty-five is eligible
45
for jury service, subject to various provisos which will be dealt with shortly.
46
Until relatively recently, there was a property qualification, but this was in47
creasingly ignored in practice and finally abolished in 1980. Thus, the clerk of
the sheriff court now obtains a list of names randomly drawn from the electoral
roll and writes to those so chosen, requesting the details necessary to establish
48
whether they are eligible for jury service. This same procedure is also appli49
cable to any High Court trials which take place in the sheriffdom.
As in other jurisdictions, various categories of persons are ineligible because of their involvement in the criminal justice system, including members of
the judiciary and court staff, legal practitioners, police and prison officers,
40. For example, in England and Hong Kong. See generally FRAUD TRIALS COMMITTEE,
REPORT; see also PETER DUFF ET AL., JURIES: A HONG KONG PERSPECTIVE 43-51 (1992); Michael
Levi, The Role of the Jury in Complex Cases, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK, supra note 37, at 95-111.
41. See THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶¶ 51.34-.41.
42. See id.
43. See SCOTTISH OFFICE, JURIES AND VERDICTS, 1994, ¶¶ 4.1-.4 [hereinafter JURIES AND
VERDICTS].
44. See SCOTTISH OFFICE, FIRM AND FAIR, 1994, Cmnd. 2600 [hereinafter FIRM AND FAIR]. The
jury proposals are in chapter 3.
45. See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act § 1, sched. 1 as amended (1980) (Scot.) for
jury ineligibility and disqualification rules.
46. See Juries Act § 1 (1825) (Scot.).
47. See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, sched. 3 (1980) (Scot.). A similar reform had
taken place in England and Wales some 10 years earlier under the Criminal Justice Act § 25 (1972).
48. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 15-07.
49. See id.
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procurators fiscal and their staff, and various types of social workers involved
50
with the juvenile justice system and probation schemes. A more recent category of persons disqualified are those who have at any time been sentenced to
five years’ imprisonment or more, or who have received a sentence of three
months and have not yet been rehabilitated under the Rehabilitation of Of51
fenders Act of 1974. An even more recently added disqualification was for
52
anyone on bail for any offence. Further, persons suffering from serious men53
tal disorders are disqualified from jury service. Finally, in order to ensure that
potential jurors have a sufficient grasp of the English language, the statute
stipulates that they must have been resident in the United Kingdom for any pe54
riod of at least five years since attaining the age of thirteen.
Certain other groups of persons are entitled to be excused from jury service
of right, due to the social value of their occupations. These include doctors,
dentists, nurses, pharmacists, and veterinarians, members of the armed forces,
ministers of religion and those in holy orders, and members of the United
55
Kingdom and European parliaments. Those who have attended for jury serv56
ice within the last five years are also entitled to be excused of right. Finally,
any potential juror may seek to be excused for good reason, for example, if
they are suffering from a serious long-term illness making their attendance at
57
court impossible.
As a result of the various disqualifications and exemptions, there has been
recent concern that juries are not as representative of the community as they
might be. These concerns led to consideration of the problem of “juror attri58
tion” in a general consultation paper on the jury issued by the Scottish Office.
The suggestion was that the procedures for selecting and contacting jurors from
the electoral roll were not working as well as they might, and more significantly, that larger proportions of potential jurors from the middle and upper
59
socio-economic groups were disqualified or being excused from jury service.
A study carried out for the consultation paper demonstrated that of 11,806
members of the public in Edinburgh eligible to serve on the jury, contact was
60
made with only 7,500 (sixty-eight percent) by the sheriff clerk. Of these, 2,520
were statutorily excluded, 1,560 were excused, and, ultimately, only 3,283
61
(thirty percent) were present in court as potential jurors. Further, thirty-eight
50. See Law Reform Act, sched. 1, pt. 1 (1980) (Scot.).
51. See id. pt. 2.
52. See Criminal Justice Act § 7 (1995) (Scot.).
53. See Law Reform Act, sched. 1, pt. 1 (1980) (Scot.).
54. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 15-01.
55. See Law Reform Act, sched. 1, pt. 3 (1980) (Scot.). More cynical readers might question the
inclusion of the last listed group as socially useful.
56. See id.
57. See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act § 1(5) (1980) (Scot.).
58. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, ¶ 3.35.
59. See id. app. 1, at 48.
60. See id. app. 1, at 49.
61. See id. ¶¶ 3.27-.28.
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percent of potential jurors from the upper socio-economic group were excused
compared with eighteen percent and twenty-three percent from the bottom two
62
groups. This paper led to proposals for reform in a government White Paper
63
on criminal justice, and legislation was then enacted to try to reduce the level
of “attrition” and make it more difficult to secure an excusal on the ground of
64
inconvenience.
Once eligibility has been established, a list of potential jurors is drawn up
and the sheriff clerk summons sufficient persons when a trial is about to take
65
place. The resulting “list of assize” is kept in the clerk’s office and, upon ap66
plication, a copy is available without charge to the defence. Until very recently, the list of assize had to state the occupation of the prospective jurors,
but following a recommendation which resulted from the recent review of the
67
jury, this requirement was removed and the list now records only jurors’
68
names and addresses. The reason for this was that while jurors’ occupations
were thought to form the basis for many peremptory challenges, occupation
alone was not thought sufficient to justify any challenge for cause upon the
69
abolition of peremptory challenges. Therefore, there was no “substantive rea70
son” for jurors’ occupations to be revealed. The jurors are selected by ballot
in open court from those potential jurors who have appeared at court in re71
sponse to being cited.
C. Questioning of Jurors and Challenge for Cause
There is no equivalent to the voir dire procedure in Scotland, a fact which
might surprise some American readers. The strong opposition of the Scottish
criminal justice system to any procedure of this type is well illustrated by the
72
observations of the Appeal Court in McCadden v. H. M. Advocate:
There may never be a process which eliminates the possibility of personal prejudices
existing among jurors, the nearest practical one (and it is not foolproof) being possibly the “vetting” of jurors, a system against which the law of Scotland has steadfastly
closed the doors. Evidence of how it is used and abused in countries in which it is operated only tends to confirm the wisdom of that decision.73

The court went on to observe that it should not be “lightly assumed” that
jurors will pursue their prejudices in defiance of their oath and the directions of
62. See id. app. 1, at 51.
63. See FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44, ch. 3.
64. See Criminal Justice Act §§ 6, 7 (1995) (Scot.).
65. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 15-10.
66. See id. ¶ 15-08.
67. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, ¶ 3.35; see also FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44,
¶:3.11.
68. See Criminal Justice Act § 6 (1995) (Scot.).
69. For a discussion of challenges, see infra Parts III.C-D.
70. FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44, ¶ 3.11.
71. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 18.34.
72. 1985 J.C. 98. The opinion was given on behalf of the court by the Lord Justice Clerk, Scotland’s second most senior judge.
73. Id. at 102.
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74

the judge. On a more practical note, the court pointed out that the broad base
from which jurors are drawn means that any prejudices and biases tend to cancel each other out, and further, that the majority verdict, whereby a bare eightto-seven vote either way suffices, ensures that it is unlikely that one prejudiced
75
juror can affect the outcome of the case.
As a consequence, there may be no general questioning of potential jurors
by the judge or by any of the parties to the case. The total antipathy of the
Scottish legal system to any form of voir dire is also illustrated in M. v. H. M.
76
Advocate. This case involved terrorist offences which had spilled over from
77
Northern Ireland to Scotland. At the request of one of the defence counsel,
potential jurors were asked by the judge whether they had lost any near relatives in the religious and political disturbances in Northern Ireland which might
78
affect their ability to give unbiased consideration to the issues involved. As it
79
happens, no jurors declared themselves to be in this position. During the
course of an appeal based on other grounds, however, the Appeal Court stated
that they did not approve of this procedure:
[T]here should be no general questioning . . . of persons cited for possible jury service
to ascertain whether any of them could or should be excused from jury service in a
particular trial . . . . The essence of the system of trial by jury is that it consists of fifteen individuals chosen at random from amongst those who are cited for possible
service.80

Further, most views presented to the Thomson Committee on Criminal
Procedure, which reported shortly after the above case, were also opposed to
81
any kind of investigation of jurors’ attitudes.
Challenges for cause are permissible, but because such challenges are very
82
rare, no clear procedure has evolved for dealing with them. It has always been
regarded as sufficient cause for challenge if a potential juror is clearly disabled
83
in some way, for example, if he is insane, deaf, dumb, or blind, but further development of this area of law has obviously been severely limited by the attitude to questioning jurors. It is difficult to challenge a juror for cause if one has
no information about that juror beyond a name and address or, formerly, an
occupation. Further, it has been held that
[i]t is not a sufficient cause for a juror to be excused that he is of a particular race, religion, or political belief or occupation, or indeed that the juror might or might not

74. Id.
75. See infra text accompanying note 131.
76. 1974 S.L.T. (Notes) 25 (H.C.J.). These observations were made by the Lord Justice General,
Scotland’s most senior judge, in the course of giving the court’s opinion.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶ 51.27.
82. See id. ¶ 51.23.
83. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 18.36.
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feel prejudice one way or the other towards the crime itself or to the background
against which the crime has been committed.84

On the other hand, it is regarded as sufficient cause if a potential juror has a
personal connection with one of the parties to the case or has personal knowl85
edge of the facts. In order to ensure that such jurors are identified, before the
case is called, the clerk tells potential jurors the names of the accused, the complainant, and anyone else named in the indictment and indicates that if they
86
know any of these persons, they should make this known. Once the jury has
been empanelled, the judge may remind the jurors that if they know any of the
parties involved or feel that there is any reason why they should not serve on
87
the jury, they should make this known to the court immediately.
In essence, however, it can be seen that the philosophy underlying jury selection in Scotland, as well as in England and Wales, is very different from that
governing the process in the United States. In Scotland, there is a very strong
view that the accused, and the prosecutor, must simply accept the jurors who
emerge randomly from the selection process. The feeling is that the prejudices
and biases of the various individuals comprising the jury will assume little significance in the dynamic of group decisionmaking, particularly when a bare
majority suffices. There is a lot to be said for this point of view. The complete
lack of information about prospective jurors means that no attempt can be
made by either side to “stack” the jury in its favour. Further, the simplicity of
the selection procedure helps to ensure that the jury really does represent the
community, although this of course means that any prejudices generally held in
the community are likely to be replicated in the jury room. In practical terms,
the absence of any kind of voir dire procedure also renders trial by jury quicker
and cheaper than on the other side of the Atlantic.
In conclusion, it is once again significant that what is perceived to be an integral part of the institution of trial by jury in one group of related jurisdictions
is regarded with abhorrence in a different group of jurisdictions. It is clear that
these views are shaped by specific histories and cultures rather than deriving
logically and necessarily from the principles which support trial by jury.
D. Peremptory Challenge
In Scotland, the right of peremptory challenge has gradually disappeared.
The position was formalised in the early nineteenth century when the accused
88
was granted five peremptory challenges, but the number was reduced to three

See M. v. H. M. Advocate, 1974 S.L.T. J25 (H.C.J).
See Pullar v. H. M. Advocate, 1993 S.C. (J.C.) 126, 134-35 (1993).
See id. at 134.
See id. at 135.
See Jurors Act § 16 (1825) (Scot.); WILLOCK, supra note 1, at 193. However, ALBERT V.
SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ¶ 1.42 (1990), states that the right of peremptory challenge was
formalised in the Jurors in Criminal Trials Act § 1 (1822) (Scot.). The last manifestation of this right
was in the Criminal Procedure Act § 130 (1975) (Scot.).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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in 1980, and abolished altogether in 1995. Three reasons have been cited to
justify this whittling away of the peremptory challenge. First, it was sometimes
argued that such challenges increased the overall inconvenience to the public of
jury service because additional jurors had to be cited to cater for the possibility
91
of such challenges, particularly in cases involving several accused. Second, it
was frequently alleged that good citizens, who were willingly attempting to fulfil their civic duty, were puzzled, embarrassed, or even angered by being chal92
lenged in open court for reasons they simply did not understand. Both these
arguments have some validity. The third and most influential argument, which
clinched the abolition of the peremptory challenge, was the allegation that this
opportunity was frequently “abused” by the defence in an attempt to secure a
93
jury which was less likely to convict. It was suggested that prospective jurors
were challenged on the basis of sex, occupation, or even dress, the wearing of a
94
suit and tie being regarded as fatal to one’s chances of making the jury panel.
It was also claimed that in cases of fraud or financial crime, prospective jurors
who seemed likely to be able to understand the facts in the case—for example,
95
accountants or bankers—were routinely challenged. This argument is based
upon two assumptions, and it is worth examining each of these in turn.
First, there is the claim that defence solicitors and advocates regularly
“abused” their peremptory challenges in an attempt to secure the type of jury
96
they wanted. Assuming that this does amount to “abuse,” which of course
might well be contested, it is fair to say that there is much anecdotal evidence
97
to support this charge, although there is virtually nothing in the way of any
firm data about the extent and nature of the phenomenon. The government’s
recent consultation paper admitted as much, stating that “there is no direct evidence of whether and on what scale such abuse occurs,” but added that “the
98
procedure clearly has the potential for abuse.” Of the 994 jurors in the attrition study who were balloted, six percent were challenged, five percent by the
defence and one percent by the Crown, and while there was no evidence of any
sexual bias in the use of the challenge, it did seem that potential jurors from the
upper socio-economic groups were more likely to be challenged by the de99
fence. It should be noted, however, that the numbers involved were very
small. Only forty-eight jurors from the upper socio-economic group were bal89. See Criminal Justice Act § 23 (1980) (Scot.).
90. See Criminal Justice Act § 8 (1995) (Scot.)
91. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, ¶¶ 3.28-.34.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. ¶ 3.30.
95. See id.; see also THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶ 51.29.
96. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, ¶¶ 3.28-.34.
97. See id.
98. Id. ¶ 3.31.
99. See id. app. 1, ¶ 10.4, tbl. 10. Of course, this might simply mean that in some cases, men were
routinely challenged whereas in others, it was women that were treated in this way, and that these opposing trends cancelled each other out.
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loted, eight of whom were challenged (seventeen percent) as against 306 jurors
from the next highest socio-economic group, of whom eight percent were chal100
lenged. This hardly seems sufficiently convincing evidence to justify the abolition of a procedure which had formed part of trial by jury for almost two hundred years.
The second step in the argument is that the “abuse” of the peremptory
101
challenges led to an increased likelihood of acquittal. There is no evidence to
support this claim. Such an argument assumes that Scottish defence practitioners, with virtually no information to go on, were successful in predicting the
likely reactions of potential jurors to particular cases. Evidence from other jurisdictions suggests that even where there is much more information available
about prospective jurors, it is extremely difficult for the lawyers involved to
102
predict their behaviour. Further, the argument assumes that, even if Scottish
practitioners did have some success, three challenges (or previously five) were
enough to alter the dynamics of a jury of fifteen which may reach a verdict on
the basis of a simple majority. Clearly, the role of any individual juror can be
much more crucial where there is a requirement of unanimity or some sort of
weighted majority. Significantly, some Home Office research carried out in
England and Wales before the abolition of the peremptory challenge there on
103
similar unsatisfactory grounds revealed that the acquittal rate was no higher
104
in cases where the challenge had been used than in cases where it had not.
Therefore, the reasons given for the abolition of the peremptory challenge
in Scotland were unsatisfactory. There was little evidence that it was being
“abused” and no evidence whatsoever that this “abuse” had any effect on the
outcome of cases. This is regrettable because, in my view, there is a perfectly
respectable argument of principle which could have been used against the peremptory challenge. Quite simply, the jury in Scotland is clearly meant to be fifteen people chosen at random from the community, and there is no justification
for either side to attempt to alter its composition except where there are
grounds for challenge for cause. Furthermore, the existence of the bare majority verdict means that the presence of one biased juror is very unlikely to make
any difference to the outcome of the case, unlike the position where there is a
requirement of unanimity. Yet this type of argument was rarely advanced by
those responsible for the demise of the peremptory challenge in Scotland. The
right thing was done for the wrong reasons.

100. See id.
101. See id. ¶ 3.30.
102. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 76-78 (1986); see also SEAN
ENRIGHT & JAMES MORTON, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE CRIMINAL JURY IN THE 1990S, at 63-67
(1990).
103. See Criminal Justice Act § 118 (1988) (Scot.). See also ENRIGHT & MORTON, supra note 102,
ch. 4, for details.
104. See Julie Vennard & David Riley, The Use of the Peremptory Challenge and Stand by of Jurors
and Their Relationship to Trial Outcome, 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 731-38.
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Finally, it is interesting to note that the disappearance of the peremptory
challenge aroused little reaction in Scotland, whereas in England, its gradual
demise caused an outcry and was often portrayed as a serious attack upon the
105
civil liberties of defendants. Again, what was often regarded as a fundamental aspect of jury trial in England appears to have been discarded quite easily in
Scotland. To some extent, this might be explained by the existence of the requirement for a ten-to-two majority in England, but it probably also reflects the
differing ideologies which simply happen to have grown up around the same institution, without much basis for their differences in terms of strict logic.
106

E. Publicity Before and During the Trial

Essentially, all that may appear in the media about a criminal prosecution is
a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings, published contemporaneously
107
and in good faith. The Scottish judiciary takes a very severe attitude toward
any potentially prejudicial publicity before or during the trial. While the position is now primarily governed by legislation, it is useful to examine the common law position first. One recent example will suffice to demonstrate the
stringent approach invariably adopted by the Scottish courts. In Muir v. British
Broadcasting Corporation, the BBC was about to broadcast an update of an
earlier programme about prisoners being beaten by prison officers in Glasgow’s
108
Barlinnie prison. The programme reported a prison doctor’s view that a particular individual’s injuries were consistent with his having been assaulted by
109
guards. The report further revealed that the doctor had been dismissed from
the prison service but was being backed by the British Medical Association, and
that the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture also believed the
110
prisoner’s injuries were consistent with his allegations of mistreatment.
The
prison doctor was to be a witness in a trial of three prison officers for assaulting
inmates at Barlinnie which was due to start the following month. The charges
did not relate to the prisoner featured in the programme, and there was no reference to the accused in the programme nor to the proceedings against them.
Nevertheless, on application by the three accused, the High Court banned the
programme because there was a “distinct risk that at least one out of the fifteen
jurors may get the impression from this programme that Doctor Danson was a
witness of considerable credit whose views should be taken to be of great im111
portance.”
The Court observed that the test to be applied in such cases is
105. See Sean Enright, Reviving the Challenge for Cause, 139 NEW L.J. 9-10, 19 (1989); see also
TONY GIFFORD, WHERE’S THE JUSTICE: A MANIFESTO FOR LAW REFORM 50-51 (1986); James Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge—An Obituary, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 528-38; E.P. Thompson, Subduing
the Jury, LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, Dec. 4, 1986, at 7-9 & Dec. 18, 1986, at 12-13.
106. For a discussion of contempt of court in Scotland, see E RIC M. CLIVE ET AL., SCOTS LAW FOR
JOURNALISTS 100-31 (5th ed. 1988).
107. See Contempt of Court Act § 4 (1981) (Scot.).
108. 1997 S.L.T 425 (H.C.J.).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 427-28.
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112

whether there is “more than minimal risk of prejudice.” Thus, either the accused or the Crown may apply to prevent media coverage of not only their own
case, but of a much broader range of subjects which might impinge incidentally
upon the forthcoming trial.
In terms of statute, the Contempt of Court Act of 1981 makes it an offence
of strict liability to publish, including broadcast, anything which creates a
“substantial risk” that the course of justice in any “active” proceedings will be
113
“seriously impeded or prejudiced.” This legislation covers Scotland, England,
and Wales, but, as Alistair J. Bonnington states, “its application in Scotland is
so starkly different from that in England that it is difficult to believe that the
114
two jurisdictions are dealing with the same statutory provisions.”
First, the
Lord Advocate, Scotland’s senior law officer, is much more likely than his
English counterpart, the Attorney General, to act when there has been prejudi115
cial publicity. Second, the Scottish courts have interpreted the provision that
there must be a “substantial risk” to mean that there must be “some risk,
116
greater than a minimal one,” of prejudice. This rather odd interpretation of
the statutory formula means that it is relatively easy in Scotland to allege con117
tempt. Finally, in Scotland, the accused himself may bring proceedings under
the Act, whereas in England the Attorney General must either bring or consent
118
to any such proceedings.
Bonnington demonstrates the contrasting approaches adopted in Scotland
and England with reference to a recent English case, where the Attorney General refused to take action over what was undoubtedly prejudicial reporting of
a trial, on the ground that he thought that contempt proceedings were unlikely
119
to succeed. Bonnington observes that in Scotland the Lord Advocate would
undoubtedly have prosecuted in such a case, and further, that if he had not, the
120
accused could have taken action. Bonnington’s predicted result of such proceedings in Scotland was that “there is little doubt that all newspapers would
have been convicted and would have suffered substantial fines—in the case of
121
122
the Sun[ ] editor, a jail sentence would have been quite likely.” In summary,
therefore, the strict approach of the Scottish judiciary to the possibility of
prejudicial reporting has meant that the media has rarely impinged upon jury

112. Id. at 427.
113. Contempt of Court Act § 2 (1981) (Scot.).
114. Alistair J. Bonnington, Press and Prejudice, 145 NEW L.J. 1623 (1995).
115. See id.
116. H. M. Advocate v. Caledonian Newspapers Ltd., 1995 S.L.T. 926, 930.
117. See generally CLIVE ET AL., supra note 106, at 103, who thought that this was a “new and important” test because it clarified a previously vague standard. However, as events show, this view
proved to be unduly optimistic.
118. See Contempt of Court Act § 7 (1981) (Scot.). This difference reflects the common law position in each of the jurisdictions.
119. See Bonnington, supra note 114, at 1623.
120. See id.
121. The most popular tabloid newspaper in the United Kingdom.
122. Bonnington, supra note 114, at 1623.
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trial in Scotland. It should be remembered that, unlike in the United States, in
Scotland there is no constitutional right to freedom of expression or freedom of
information to counter-balance the strict laws of contempt.
Despite their draconian attitude toward potentially prejudicial publicity,
Scottish judges have not looked sympathetically upon claims made by the accused about the effects of adverse publicity where this has unfortunately occurred. Bonnington observes that there has never been a successful application
to prevent a trial proceeding because of prejudicial pretrial publicity, nor a successful appeal against conviction based on the grounds of prejudicial public123
ity.
He cites in illustration of this claim the rather contradictory case of
124
Stuurman v. H. M. Advocate, where the court imposed large fines on the me125
dia for “causing ‘the greatest risk of prejudice,’” and yet only a few weeks
126
later decided that the accused could nevertheless receive a fair trial. Another
127
interesting case is H. v. Sweeney, where the trial proceeded despite over128
whelming publicity, including the resignation of the Solicitor General, the
publication of alleged confessions by the accused, and “no fewer than 160 arti129
cles” in the media. The High Court’s view was that the admittedly prejudicial
coverage of the case was outweighed by the public interest in the prosecution of
serious crime, the gap of several months before the trial was to commence, and
the beneficial effect upon the jury of a careful direction by the judge not to be
130
swayed by the publicity.
F. The Number of Jurors
The Scottish criminal jury comprises fifteen persons. In the early days of
jury trial, the number of jurors was not fixed, although there was always a pref131
erence for an odd number because of the existence of the majority verdict.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the jury virtually always comprised fifteen
132
persons. This practice was eventually confirmed implicitly in the Jurors Act.
In the 1970s, the Thomson Committee considered the possibility of a smaller
133
jury.
Its primary concern was whether it was necessary to inconvenience
quite so many members of the public, observing that the Scottish civil jury, as

See id.
See id. (relying generally on Stuurman, 1980 J.C. 111, 111-13, 121 (1980)).
Id.
See id.
1983 S.L.T. 48, 55-57 (H.C.J.) (The Lord Justice-General).
Scotland’s second most senior law officer.
See Sweeney, 1983 S.L.T. at 56; see also ROSS HARPER & ARNOT MCWHINNIE, THE
GLASGOW RAPE CASE 139-42 (1983).
130. See Sweeney, 1983 S.L.T. at 56-57.
131. See WILLOCK, supra note 1, at 184-90.
132. §§ 7, 17 (1825) (Scot.); see WILLOCK, supra note 1, at 189.
133. See THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶ 51.12. The Committee stressed that this recommendation was dependent upon the retention of the three verdict system. For a discussion of this, see
infra Part III.I.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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well as criminal juries in other jurisdictions, operated with fewer jurors. Although the committee was not impressed with the argument that a slightly
smaller jury was less likely to provide a representative cross-section of the
135
population, dismissing this as “speculative,” it nonetheless concluded that the
number of jurors should be reduced to twelve, with a simple majority of seven
136
votes being necessary for a guilty verdict.
However, this recommendation
was not acted upon. The more recent Scottish Office review also raised the
question of unnecessary inconvenience to citizens and asked for views on the
137
reduction of the size of the jury to eleven, twelve, or thirteen persons. Most
of those who responded were not in favour of any change and thus, the number
138
of jurors was left at fifteen. Both the Thomson Committee and the Scottish
Office review emphasised that the size of the jury could not be looked at in
isolation and was bound up with the majority required for a verdict and the
139
three verdict system.
Consequently, I shall return to the number of jurors
when these issues are discussed below.
140

G. Management of the Jury

After the jury has taken the oath, there must be no communication on the
subject of the trial between a juror and nonjuror. If this rule is broken, the trial
is not necessarily abandoned, nor is any conviction necessarily quashed. The
consequences of the infringement depend very much on the circumstances, in
particular the severity of the breach and its potential to prejudice the trial. If
the infringement is minor, it may not be necessary to excuse the juror and a direction by the judge to the jury may suffice. Alternatively, the juror may be excused and the trial may continue. However, if the breach is particularly serious
and there is a danger that it may prejudice the whole jury, it may well be necessary to abandon the trial. Where a trial is adjourned overnight, the jury is not
secluded (that is, sequestered) except in the most exceptional of cases. Once
the verdict is being considered the matter is entirely different, and the jury
141
must be secluded.
If a juror becomes ill during a trial or is excused for some other reason, the
trial may continue provided that there are not less than twelve jurors remain142
ing. In such cases, a majority of eight jurors is still required to return a guilty
143
verdict; otherwise the result must be acquittal. There is no provision in Scot134. See THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶ 51.08.
135. Id. ¶ 51.11.
136. See id. ¶ 51.13.
137. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, ¶¶ 5.1.-.4.
138. See FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44, ¶¶ 3.20, 3.21.
139. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, ¶¶ 5.1-.4; THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶
51.12.
140. The following section is based very closely on RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶¶ 18.42-.45,
where all the necessary citation of the statutory provisions and cases will be found.
141. See infra notes 151, 152 and accompanying text.
142. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶¶ 18.42-.45.
143. See id.
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land for alternate jurors. Such a provision has not as yet proved necessary because trials rarely last for more than a couple of days and up to three jurors
144
may be lost without the trial having to be abandoned.
It is worth noting that in Scotland there are no opening statements by the
lawyers. Instead, jurors are given a copy of the indictment, which comprises a
145
narrative of the essence of the case against the accused.
Immediately after
the prosecution has presented all its witnesses, the defence may submit that
there is no case to answer. The arguments are heard outside the presence of
the jury and if the submission succeeds, the judge, rather than the jury, acquits
146
the accused. If the submission is unsuccessful, the case simply continues. In
making this decision, the judge should not assess the credibility or reliability of
the evidence since these are jury matters; he should simply determine whether
147
the evidence, if accepted, would be sufficient in law for conviction. It is worth
noting that this procedure was unknown in Scotland until it was imported from
England in 1980. As well as the statutory power to withdraw the case from the
jury at the close of the prosecution case, the judge also has a common law
power, which he may exercise on application or of his own volition, to hold that
there is insufficient evidence to allow the case to go to the jury. However, he
may do this only after all the evidence has been heard and the closing speeches
made. In this eventuality, the judge cannot acquit the accused, but must direct
148
the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.
The Sutherland Committee recently raised the question of whether the
judge should be empowered to withdraw a case from the jury or to direct the
acquittal “if he believes [the jury] could not reasonably reach a guilty verdict”;
the Committee suggested that this matter, which was peripheral to its remit,
149
should be given further consideration. It added nothing further, but the proposal seems to imply that the judge should make some assessment of the reliability and credibility of the evidence. If so, this is a rather revolutionary proposal because it seems to involve a degree of usurpation by the judge of the
jury’s role. For example, if, in the judge’s opinion, no jury could reasonably
believe the main prosecution witness, and there is insufficient other evidence to
convict, then the judge should presumably withdraw the case from the jury. As
yet, the government has not taken this matter up, and it seems probable that
the proposal will simply be forgotten, largely because of its radical nature.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Criminal Procedure Act § 97 (1995) (Scot.).
147. The Scottish requirement that the prosecution evidence must be corroborated is of particular
importance in this context. For instance, it might be that the evidence of the victim, although totally
convincing, is not corroborated by any evidence from another source, in which case the judge would be
bound to accede to the defence application that there is no case to answer and acquit the accused.
148. See Kent v. H. M. Advocate, 1950 J.C. 38, 39; see also RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 1876.
149. SUTHERLAND COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL APPEALS AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE
PROCEDURES, 1996, Cmnd. 3245, at 19, 20 [hereinafter CRIMINAL APPEALS]. Its deliberations will be
further discussed below in Part III.J.
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At the end of the trial, the prosecutor and defence briefly address the jury,
and then the judge directs the jury as to the law. The judge is not required to
summarise the evidence, as he is in some jurisdictions, but particularly in a long
150
or complicated trial, he would normally remind the jury of the main points.
When the jury retires to consider its verdict, the clerk of court, acting in prac151
tice through a court officer, encloses the jurors in a room by themselves.
If
152
necessary, the jury must be secluded in overnight accommodation.
Apart
from instructions by the judge in connection with administrative matters—for
example, food and accommodation or emergencies—no one may visit the jury
room, nor may any juror leave it, except where further directions are sought or
153
given or where the jury asks to examine a production.
The legislation provides that any contravention of these provisions shall lead to the acquittal of
154
the accused.
Under the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, which applies both in Scotland
and south of the border, it is contempt for anyone to obtain, disclose, or solicit
155
any particulars of the deliberations in the jury room. Thus, the phenomenon
in the United States of jurors revealing the secrets of the jury room, sometimes
for large sums of money, cannot happen in Great Britain. This rigorous approach was implemented in 1981 following revelations in a political weekly by a
juror from the trial of a prominent politician for conspiracy to murder, and the
156
subsequent failure of an attempt to prosecute the magazine for contempt.
The major disadvantage of the legislation is that it makes serious research into
juries’ reasons for their verdicts virtually impossible. For this reason, the recent English Royal Commission on Criminal Justice recommended that the Act
be amended to allow research into the process by which jurors reach deci157
158
sions. This proposal is still under consideration by the government.
H. The Majority Verdict
The Scottish criminal jury may return a verdict, whether for conviction or
159
Consequently,
acquittal, on the basis of a bare majority of eight to seven.
there is no such thing as a hung jury; every trial produces a verdict. The jury
should be directed by the judge that eight votes are necessary for conviction,
and it should not be told to try for unanimity before returning a majority ver-

150. See Shepherd v. H. M. Advocate, 1997 S.L.T. 525, 528 (H.C.J.).
151. See Criminal Procedure Act § 99 (1995) (Scot.).
152. See Thomson v. H. M. Advocate, 1998 S.L.T. 364, 365-66 (H.C.J.).
153. See Criminal Procedure Act § 99 (1995) (Scot.).
154. See id.
155. Contempt of Court Act § 8(c)(1) (1981) (Scot.).
156. See Attorney-General v. New Statesman and Nation Publ’g Co., 1 All E.R. 644, 646-47, 650
(1980) (holding that the Attorney General’s contempt of court argument was not justified in this particular instance).
157. See ENGLISH ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT, 1993, Cmnd. 2263, at 2.
158. See FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44, ¶ 3.14; see also CRIMINAL APPEALS, supra note 149, ¶ 3.7.
159. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 18-79.
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160

dict.
In returning the jury’s verdict, the foreman must state, or be asked,
whether it is unanimous or by majority, but should not be asked for the size of
161
the majority. The Thomson Committee considered the possibility that the actual numbers of those voting for each of the three verdicts should be an162
nounced in open court in order to prevent mistakes.
Because it infringed
upon the privacy of the jury room, this option did not find favour with the
committee. However, the Committee suggested that the judge might be encouraged to enquire into the voting in order to satisfy himself that the verdict
163
was correct. More recently, in McCadden v. H. M. Advocate, the Lord Justice
Clerk suggested that the jurors ought to be asked how many of them voted
164
guilty, but this was disregarded in practice and disapproved in the subsequent
165
case of Pullar. Thus, the size of the majority remains a mystery in all cases.
In his history of the Scottish jury, Willock observes that the verdict of the
166
He sugScottish jury seems always to have been reached by majority vote.
gests that in medieval times, verdicts were reached by taking the sense of the
meeting, or the feeling of the community, and that dissent was tolerated but not
167
thought to be of much importance.
Thus, by midway through the sixteenth
century, the majority verdict had become formally established as an integral
part of trial by jury, encouraging the use of an odd number of jurors, and it also
had become established that a majority of one was sufficient to determine the
168
verdict. In contrast, a firm rule had developed in England by the middle of
the fourteenth century, remaining unaltered until very recently, that the verdict
169
must be unanimous.
The adequacy of a bare majority of eight to seven is obviously open to question. This emerges very starkly when one considers that until the abolition of
capital punishment in the early 1960s, it was theoretically possible for someone
to be executed on the basis of this majority. In essence, is it really safe to convict someone if seven out of fifteen jurors think that the case has not been satisfactorily proven? If almost half of the jurors are not convinced of the accused’s
guilt, is this not evidence in itself that the case has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt? These questions have been ably analysed by Gerry Maher, who
argues that the rule of unanimity is not always necessary to show that the prin170
ciple of proof beyond reasonable doubt is being taken seriously. In his view,
one must take into account other means by which the criminal process attempts
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
52.

See id.
See Criminal Procedure Act § 100(1) (1995) (Scot.).
See THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶¶ 51.51-.56.
See id.
1985 J.C. 98, 103 (1985).
Pullar v. H. M. Advocate, 1993 S.C. (J.C.) 126, 136-37.
See WILLOCK, supra note 1, at 226.
See id.
See id.
See infra text accompanying note 173.
See Gerry Maher, The Verdict of the Jury, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK, supra note 37, at 45-
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to ensure proof of guilt at a level of practical certainty. The Scottish system, for
instance, demands corroboration of the Crown case and provides the protection
171
of the not proven verdict.
Nevertheless, Maher does question whether conviction by a simple majority does in fact give sufficient weight to the principle
172
of requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, a practical advantage of the Scottish position is that there is no such
thing as a hung trial. However, a less obvious point is made by Maher in his critique of the English position. The law in England now requires a majority of
173
ten to two, whether for conviction or acquittal. Where the jury splits nine to
174
three, there will be a retrial. As Maher observes, this does not sit comfortably with the presumption of innocence or with the associated principle of dou175
ble jeopardy. The prosecution has had its chance to prove the accused’s guilt
and has failed; surely the presumption of innocence means that the accused is
entitled to be acquitted. As Maher puts it, “[t]he presumption of innocence
therefore closes the logical space between proof of guilt and proof of innocence,” and thus where the verdict is not one of guilt, the result must be acquit176
tal rather than a retrial. This criticism cannot be levelled at the Scottish position.
The majority verdict has been considered on several occasions in recent
years. The Thomson Committee canvassed, without much enthusiasm, the possibility that the ratio required for a guilty verdict should be two to one, that is,
ten to five or, if the size of the jury were reduced, eight to four, but the over177
whelming weight of submissions was in favour of retaining the bare majority.
Ultimately, only one member of the Committee dissented from this view, the
remainder arguing that a “weighted” majority was unnecessary in view of other
safeguards for the protection of the innocent. The Committee suggested that if
its recommendation to reduce the size of the jury to twelve persons were
adopted, a seven-to-five majority should be required for conviction and an even
178
split of six to six should lead to acquittal. The recent Scottish Office review
also sought reaction to a possible increase in the number required for convic179
tion, particularly if the three verdict system were to be abolished. It cited the
arguments both for and against the simple majority, while expressing no opin180
ion on the matter itself. The government announced that most respondents
to this review favoured the straightforward majority, and given that the size of

171. See infra Part III.I.
172. See Maher, supra note 170, at 45-52.
173. See id. at 43.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 50-52.
176. Id. at 50.
177. See THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶¶ 51.06-.07.
178. See id. ¶ 51.12. This would not be symmetrical and consequently avoids the practical and theoretical difficulties often posed by the “weighted” majority verdict.
179. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, ch. 6.
180. See id.
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the jury was to remain at fifteen and the three verdict system was to be re181
tained, there was no case for changing the existing position.
Finally, it is worth noting that the abandonment of the unanimity rule in
182
England and its replacement with the requirement of a ten-to-two majority
provoked a great deal of vehement protest. For instance, M.D.A. Freeman
claimed that “the concept of a majority verdict strikes at the root of the fundamental principle of English law that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable
183
doubt.”
Yet in Scotland, which is ruled by the same government and has a
very similar culture, the principle that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt has happily coexisted with the majority verdict for centuries. Further,
there are several other jurisdictions where the majority verdict is not thought to
prejudice the presumption of innocence, a fact which appears to be ignored by
the English critics of the abandonment of the unanimity rule.
I.

The Three Verdict System

Undoubtedly the most peculiar aspect of the Scottish system of trial by jury
is that it allows the jury in criminal trials a choice of three verdicts: guilty, not
proven, and not guilty. This phenomenon was the result of an historical accident, but it has now formed part of the Scottish criminal justice system for over
184
250 years. The verdicts of guilty and not guilty are self-explanatory, but the
intermediate verdict of “not proven” requires some elucidation. While there is
no common law or statutory definition of “not proven,” the vital point is that it
185
has exactly the same effect as a not guilty verdict; it counts as an acquittal.
The difference is that the verdict of “not guilty” is thought to mean that the accused definitely did not commit the crime, that is, it is a positive declaration of
innocence, whereas the verdict of “not proven” is thought to imply solely that
186
the accused’s guilt has not been conclusively demonstrated.
As a result of
this uncertainty, the Court of Appeal has discouraged judges from attempting
to direct jurors as to the difference between not proven and not guilty, although
187
they must be informed of the three verdicts available to them.
It has also
been held that it is not necessary to tell jurors that not proven is a verdict of ac-

181. See FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44, ¶ 3.20.
182. See Criminal Justice Act § 13 (1967).
183. M.D.A. Freeman, The Jury on Trial, 34 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 65, 69 (1981); see also
ENRIGHT & MORTON, supra note 102, at 75-76; Blake, supra note 37, at 143.
184. See WILLOCK, supra note 1, at 217-25.
185. As explained above, where the jury is not unanimous, there must be at least eight votes for
conviction in order to convict the accused, and the judge directs the jury to this effect. Where the
votes for acquittal are split, the majority of such votes dictates whether the verdict is one of not guilty
or not proven, an even split resulting in the latter verdict. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15,
¶a18-90. This seems to indicate that if the jury is unsure which verdict to deliver, the judge should enquire into the actual figures, which is difficult to reconcile with the principle that no such enquiry
should be made. See also McCadden v. H. M. Advocate, 1985 J.C. 98, 103; Pullar v. H. M. Advocate,
1993 S.C. (J.C.) 126, 136-37.
186. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, at 29.
187. See McDonald v. H. M. Advocate, 1989 S.L.T. 289, 299 (H.C.J.).
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quittal, presumably because they are always told that at least eight votes of
guilty are required for conviction and thus can work out the consequences of a
not proven verdict for themselves.
Whatever its meaning, there is no doubt that the not proven verdict is used
fairly frequently by the Scottish courts. Around one-third of all jury acquittals
are the product of the not proven verdict, while the equivalent in nonjury trials
189
is around one-fifth. The verdict has attracted much criticism over the years,
primarily on the ground of its lack of logic. It is argued, quite simply, that if the
Crown cannot prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the only possible verdict
should be not guilty. That is dictated by the presumption of innocence, and
190
therefore there is no place for a “second class” acquittal. Debate has tended
to focus around two main arguments which are usually put forth in favour of
191
the three verdict system.
First, it is claimed that the jury may well not be convinced of the accused’s
innocence. Of particular significance here is the Scottish rule that the prosecu192
tion case must be corroborated. It is argued that there are many cases where
one witness is completely believed, but there is insufficient corroborating evidence to allow the jury, or the judge in a nonjury trial, to convict, although they
193
may be fairly certain that the accused is indeed guilty.
This might be particularly so with regard to the victim of a sexual assault. The Scottish Office
paper supports this claim by demonstrating that the not proven verdict comprised “a slightly higher proportion” of acquittals in rape and sexual assault
194
cases over a number of years. In such cases, the not proven verdict is more
satisfactory for the victim because it does not necessarily cast doubt upon her
honesty or reliability. In response to this argument, it might well be observed
that this does not alter the fact that the presumption of innocence demands a
verdict of not guilty if the Crown case cannot be proved.
Second, it is claimed that if jurors were faced with a straight choice between
guilty and not guilty, they might opt for guilty where otherwise they would have
195
found the case not proven. In other words, there would be an increased danger of wrongful convictions. The majority of the members of the Thomson
Committee were sufficiently worried by this possibility to recommend that the
not proven verdict should be retained, although they accepted the argument
196
that the three verdict system was illogical. In response, it might be observed
that, first, their concern is based purely on speculation, and, second, there is al188. See McRae v. H. M. Advocate, 1990 J.C. 28, 28-29.
189. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, at 27-28. Nevertheless, four-tenths of not proven
verdicts are returned in nonjury trials as a result of the far greater number of such trials. See id. at 28,
tbls. 1, 2.
190. See THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶ 51.05.
191. See id. ¶ 51.05; see also JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, ch. 10.
192. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 24-69.
193. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, ch. 10.
194. Id. ¶ 10.4, tbl. 3.
195. See id. ¶ 10.1.
196. See THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra note 39, ¶ 51.05.
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ways a danger of wrongful conviction, yet no other country in the world feels
that giving the jury a choice of three verdicts is a solution to this problem.
There is a third possible argument which has not been addressed in the debate over the not proven verdict. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the verdict
is sometimes used if the jury knows perfectly well that the accused is guilty but
thinks that the law needs to be tempered with mercy. The classic example
might be the wife who has been battered by her alcoholic husband for years and
eventually stabs him to death with the bread-knife as he lies in a drunken stupor on the couch. It is not unknown in such a case for a jury to return a verdict
197
of not proven to a charge of murder, even in the face of overwhelming evidence, presumably because it sees no purpose in further punishing the accused.
In essence, the not proven verdict provides the jury with a rather subtle way of
“nullifying” the law instead of having to confront it directly and openly. What
the jury is really saying through the medium of a not proven verdict is that
while it knows perfectly well the accused is guilty, it is not prepared to convict
in this particular case. Given the issues raised by jury “nullification,” it is not
surprising that this argument has not been officially cited in support of the not
proven verdict.
It is worth examining in more detail the most recent controversy over the
not proven verdict because it has attracted a great deal of public and political
interest. The debate was started by the trial of a young man for the brutal killing of a female student, which, to the astonishment of most observers, resulted
198
in a not proven verdict by the jury.
The media strongly hinted that the accused had indeed committed the crime, and the police gave the impression that
199
as far as they were concerned the matter was closed. Within weeks, the victims’ parents were organising a petition which demanded the abolition of the
not proven verdict, attracting much support and a great deal of media atten200
tion. Implicit in much of the criticism of the not proven verdict was the belief
that were it not available, the jury would have returned a guilty verdict. This,
201
of course, although likely, is impossible to tell.
Around this time, the Lord Advocate, the senior law officer in Scotland, revealed in an extensive interview with a Sunday newspaper that he felt some
202
“unease” over the not proven verdict.
Nevertheless, he confirmed that nei-

197. The doctrine of provocation would not allow the charge to be reduced to culpable homicide in
such a case.
198. For a full account of the debate, see Peter Duff, The Not Proven Verdict: Jury Mythology and
“Moral Panics”, 41 JURID. REV. 1, 1-12 (1996).
199. See id.
200. For instance, a member of Labour’s shadow ministerial team announced he would introduce a
Private Member’s Bill to abolish the verdict. See Joy Copley, Bill Launched to Abolish “Not Proven”,
SCOTSMAN, Apr. 22, 1993, at 6.
201. See Not Proven: “That Bastard Verdict” (BBC Scotland television broadcast, Focal Point
Documentary, May 13, 1993) [hereinafter BBC Broadcast]; see also FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44, at
32.
202. See Kenny Farquharson, Law Chief Uneasy over “Not Proven”, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Mar.
21, 1993, at 21.
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ther he nor the Scottish Office was persuaded that there was enough dissatis203
faction to justify scrutiny of the verdict.
However, the campaign to abolish
the not proven verdict continued to gather momentum and, shortly afterwards,
the BBC (Scotland) devoted its flagship documentary to the issue, entitling the
programme “Not Proven: ‘That Bastard Verdict’” (the latter phrase being a de204
scription of the verdict by Sir Walter Scott, who hated its illogicality ). Supporters of the verdict were given an opportunity on the programme to explain
their point of view, but the thrust of an emotive programme was essentially
hostile to the retention of the three verdict system. Further, the BBC had
commissioned a public opinion poll which produced the devastating finding
that the majority of the Scottish public, including those who had served as ju205
rors, simply did not understand the not proven verdict or its implications.
Many people erroneously thought that the accused could be retried if more
206
evidence came to light.
At this time, by pure coincidence, the Scottish Office was beginning a major
review of various aspects of the criminal justice process, the primary motive
207
being to cut costs and increase efficiency. The government simply added to
this review an examination of the not proven verdict along with various other
aspects of trial by jury, a pragmatic solution to the increasing political pres208
sure. As described above, the Scottish Office consultation paper raised several other issues, including the peremptory challenge, the size of the jury, and
the simple majority verdict, but the bulk of the paper was devoted to the not
209
proven verdict. The government expressed no opinion on its future, but simply canvassed the arguments for and against it and invited the submission of
210
views.
Ultimately, the decision was to retain the not proven verdict. The consultation exercise had not revealed “a consensus for change,” either among the legal
211
profession or the public.
Further, the government noted that respondents
were divided about the logical case for three verdicts, some asserting that “the
three verdicts were entirely logical and, indeed, more consistent with reality

203. See id.
204. Quoted in WILLOCK, supra note 1, at 217.
205. See BBC Broadcast, supra note 201; see also JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43, at 31; Alistair Bonnington, Third Option for Scots Juries, HERALD, May 13, 1993, at 15. But cf. Lord McCluskey,
Fiddling with Scottish Justice, SCOLAG 69, 70 (1994); John Robertson & Iain Duff, Parents Vow to
Continue Campaign, SCOTSMAN, June 28, 1994, at 4 (reporting comments of the Solicitor General).
206. See BBC Broadcast, supra note 201
207. See FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44, at 1.
208. See Joy Copley, Justice System in Scotland Comes Under Review, SCOTSMAN, May 26, 1993, at
1.
209. See JURIES AND VERDICTS, supra note 43.
210. See id.
211. See FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44, ¶ 3.16. It is interesting to note that a factor which influenced the Thomson Committee, other than their fear of wrongful convictions, was that “there is no
evidence that the public regard the system as working unsatisfactorily.” THOMSON COMMITTEE, supra
note 39, ¶ 5.12.
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212

than a two verdict system.” Thus, in the absence of “a considerable weight of
informed opinion against the three verdict system,” the government thought
213
that it should be kept. Regarding jurors’ possible “misconceptions” about the
verdict, it was suggested that to some extent these would have been corrected
214
by the consultation paper, although it is perhaps somewhat optimistic to think
that the public makes a habit of reading such papers. There was an assurance
in the White Paper that the judiciary had taken steps to ensure that juries un215
derstand that a verdict of not proven does not lead to a retrial.
J.

Appeal: Perversity of Jury’s Verdict

216

The right to appeal against conviction under solemn procedure was intro217
duced by the 1926 Criminal Appeal Act.
Three grounds were stipulated.
The first two were very general: “a wrong decision of any question of law” by
218
the court, and “a miscarriage of justice.” The third ground was more specific,
“the verdict of the jury . . . was unreasonable or cannot be supported having re219
gard to the evidence.” Despite this wording, the Appeal Court never granted
an appeal based solely on the perversity of the jury’s decision, only allowing
appeals under this heading where the jury’s verdict was self-contradictory or
220
illogical in some way. Thus, any attempt to argue that the jury could not have
reasonably convicted on the basis of the evidence was invariably doomed to
failure.
These three grounds of appeal were removed and replaced with a single
221
ground—“miscarriage of justice”—by the 1980 Criminal Justice Act. The intention underlying the change was probably to liberalise the attitude of the
court, but it did not affect the Appeal Court’s approach to claims that the evi222
dence simply did not sustain the jury’s verdict.
In 1984, the Lord Justice
General, Scotland’s most senior judge, commented:
Questions of the reliability and credibility of witnesses are essentially, in our law,
questions for the jury, and we know of no case in which this court has interfered with
any conviction upon the ground that, in its opinion, a jury had been perverse in
treating a key witness as both reliable and credible.223

212. FIRM AND FAIR, supra note 44, ¶ 3.17.
213. Id. ¶ 3.19.
214. See generally id. ¶¶ 3.15-.19.
215. See id. ¶ 3.18.
216. See LORD MCCLUSKEY, CRIMINAL APPEALS § 2 (1992) (providing general information on
appeals process).
217. See Criminal Appeal Act § 2 (1926) (Scot.).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Salmond v. H. M. Advocate, 1992 S.L.T. 156, 157-58 (H.C.J. Sept. 9, 1990) (appeal was allowed when a jury in an attempted murder case found the accused “guilty . . . with extreme provocation,” because this verdict was indisputably incompetent since provocation is not relevant to a charge
of attempted murder).
221. Criminal Justice Act § 33 (1980) (Scot.).
222. See RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 29-07.
223. Rubin v. H. M. Advocate, 1984 S.L.T. 369, 370-71 (H.C.J.).
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As the editors of Renton and Brown observe, “the very narrow approach
adopted under the old law to factual challenges to jury verdicts has persisted
224
into the new jurisprudence of the court.” It is also useful to note that in his
book on appeals, Lord McCluskey, a High Court judge himself, seems doubtful
that the Appeal Court will ever “retreat from the notion . . . that the conclusions . . . of the jury . . . are sacrosanct and inviolable whatever the weight and
225
coherence of the evidence.”
Various aspects of the appeal procedure were recently examined by the
Sutherland Committee, including the question of overturning the jury’s ver226
dict. The Committee agreed with the general principle that the Appeal Court
should be very reluctant to interfere with a jury’s verdict reached on the basis
227
of legal sufficiency of the evidence. It did think, however, that there might be
a few “exceptional” cases where “any reasonable jury ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt,” and argued that the Appeal Court should overturn
the jury’s verdict where that verdict is “unreasonable and has resulted in a mis228
carriage.”
Furthermore, it recommended that this power should be specifically enshrined in statute, presumably because this might help to overcome the
229
court’s notorious reluctance to interfere with the verdict of a jury.
However, the Committee did not favour the English Appeal Court’s approach of overturning a jury’s verdict on the basis of a “lurking doubt” or “gut
feeling,” because this would debase the original verdict and might lead to the
230
court being “swamped” with appeals. Instead, it preferred a more objective
test and ultimately, something very close to its suggested formulation was
231
adopted in the Crime and Punishment Act of 1997. This formula retains the
approach of creating only one ground of appeal—a “miscarriage of justice”—
but specifically includes within this heading the granting of an appeal for “the
jury’s having returned a verdict which no reasonable jury, properly directed,
232
could have returned.”
In essence, as the Sutherland Committee observed, the issue of overturning
an unreasonable verdict “strikes at the heart of the role of the jury in Scottish
233
criminal procedure.” In fact, this subject raises fundamental questions about
jury trial in every jurisdiction where the institution exists. The main justification for the jury is that it is alleged to be better at finding the facts than the
judge(s) acting alone and, consequently, it is very difficult to justify any judicial
interference with the verdict of the jury. To overturn the jury’s decision is to
224. RENTON & BROWN, supra note 15, ¶ 29-07.
225. LORD MCCLUSKEY, supra note 216, at 188.
226. See CRIMINAL APPEALS, supra note 149, ¶¶ 2.59-.71.
227. See id. ¶ 2.66.
228. Id. ¶ 2.67.
229. See id. ¶ 2.68.
230. See id. ¶ 2.69.
231. See Crime and Punishment Act § 17 (1997) (Scot.); see also CRIMINAL APPEALS, supra note
149, ¶ 2.70.
232. Crime and Punishment Act § 17 (1997) (Scot.).
233. CRIMINAL APPEALS, supra note 149, ¶ 2.66.
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demonstrate a lack of faith in the institution, calling its very existence into
doubt. That, of course, is why appeal courts in every jurisdiction are much
quicker to intervene where there has been some minor procedural hitch than
when there is a query over the essential merits of the conviction. Obviously,
one can frame the necessary test to review the jury’s decision in a variety of
ways, but whether one talks of a “lurking doubt,” or a “perverse verdict,” or
“returning a verdict which no reasonable jury could have returned,” one is
challenging the very raison d’être of trial by jury. For this reason, it seems unlikely that the new provision will make much difference to the approach of the
Scottish courts.
K. Appeal: Irregularity of Procedure and Prejudice
There is little purpose in listing all the possible irregularities in procedure
here. In practice, the most common ground of appeal under solemn procedure
234
is that of misdirection by the judge. It is clear, however, that most such cases
stem from a general dissatisfaction with the verdict and the need of the ac235
cused’s adviser to find an appropriate “peg” on which to hang an appeal.
Appeals on the grounds of other types of irregularity affecting the jury are
236
few.
Nonetheless, it is worth discussing allegations that the jury was prejudiced in some way because there have recently been several such appeals, and
by their very nature, they go to the very heart of jury trial.
The question of possible prejudice following pretrial publicity has already
been considered, and as we saw, an appeal has yet to succeed. A more common
allegation is that one or two jurors were biased against the accused for some
other reason. In this context, the most influential modern case is probably
McCadden, where, it will be remembered, the Appeal Court took the opportu237
nity to disapprove of any attempt to vet jurors in any way.
The appeal was
based on the allegation that one juror had made remarks in a social club indicating that he was prejudiced against the accused. The appeal was rejected and
while the court stated that “it cannot be held that an appeal based on alleged
malpractice by a juror . . . can never be entertained,” it was made very clear
that it would be extremely difficult for such an appeal to succeed. An inquiry
into allegations of juror malpractice would be held only where the court was
satisfied that “the evidence placed before it to substantiate the claim is prima
facie sufficiently substantial, convincing and trustworthy to warrant an in238
quiry.” In the court’s view, there were sufficient safeguards—the judicial direction, the jury of fifteen, the majority verdict, et cetera—to prevent a miscar-

234. See PETER DUFF & FRAZER MCCALLUM, GROUNDS OF APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES 22, tbl.
7 (1996). In a sample of 250 appeals against conviction under solemn procedure, which produced 350
grounds of appeal, 147 of the grounds related to alleged misdirection by the judge. See id.
235. See id.
236. In the sample of 350 appeal grounds, only four related to alleged jury irregularity. See id.
237. See McCadden v. H. M. Advocate, 1985 J.C. 98, 102.
238. Id.
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riage of justice. Further, there were obvious “dangers to the administration of
239
justice which would result from a too facile resort” to such inquiry.
The importance that the courts attach to the effect of the judicial direction
to consider the case dispassionately, as a counterweight to possible prejudice,
can hardly be overstated. In the recent case of Gray v. H. M. Advocate, the
Appeal Court summed up its approach: “It has repeatedly been observed that it
must be assumed that jurors will comply with the directions given to them by
240
the presiding judge.” In that case, the judge had stressed that the jury should
241
ignore everything but the evidence of the witnesses given in court.
Despite
strong indications that there had been contact during the trial between two jurors and a co-accused, against whom charges were withdrawn, the individuals
242
who were ultimately convicted had their appeal rejected.
One further case is worth citing in this context. In Pullar v. H. M. Advo243
cate, one of the jurors had been an employee of one of the two main prosecution witnesses. He had informed the clerk before the ballot but, on being questioned, had stated he did not know the accused or any of the circumstances of
244
245
the case. The clerk took no further action, and the juror was selected. After proceedings had begun, the prosecution witness also informed the clerk of
the relationship, and the clerk assured him that the juror had disclaimed any
246
knowledge of the case.
Hearing an appeal against conviction, the Appeal
Court accepted that the clerk should have passed this information to the judge
and that, if this had happened, the juror would have been excused, or at least
247
could have been challenged, because of the possibility of bias. It rejected the
appeal however, because this irregularity did not automatically invalidate the
verdict and there was no evidence that the juror was biased or that a miscar248
riage of justice had occurred.
The accused then unsuccessfully appealed to
the European Court of Human Rights, under Article Six of the Convention, on
249
the ground that the jury was not “independent and impartial.” The European
Court of Human Rights observed that there was no evidence of bias nor any
likelihood in the circumstances that the juror was more likely to believe his
250
employer than the defence witnesses.
Further, the integrity of the jury was
protected by various safeguards, primarily the existence of fourteen other ju239. Id. It is fair to say that in this case the two witnesses who had allegedly overheard the juror’s
remarks in the social club were unconvincing; they were not of good character, and they were friends
of the accused’s brother.
240. 1994 S.L.T. 1237, 1243 (H.C.J.) (emphasis added).
241. See id. at 1241.
242. See id. at 1244.
243. 1993 S.C. (J.C.) 126. Here, the court took the opportunity to establish the procedures for ensuring that jurors do not know the parties to the case.
244. See id. at 130.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 133.
248. See id. at 134.
249. See Pullar v. United Kingdom, 1996 S.C.C.R. 755.
250. See id.
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rors, the jurors’ oath to assess the witnesses dispassionately, and the judicial di251
rection.
IV
CONCLUSION
This account of the Scottish criminal jury has, I hope, fulfilled two purposes.
First, it has furnished a full description of the institution, and in particular, emphasised its peculiarities—principally its size, the existence of the bare majority
verdict, and the rather illogical three verdict system. Second, it has also attempted to challenge, in passing, various common preconceptions about the nature of jury trial. For instance, it should have become clear that the institution
of trial by jury does not necessarily require that the accused should have any
“right” to have his case put to a jury. Nor need it involve a complex selection
procedure, with both sides having plentiful opportunities to challenge potential
jurors on the ground of possible bias. Nor, finally, does conviction require
unanimity on the part of the jury, or a heavily weighted majority, contrary to
what is often thought.
As we have seen, the Scottish jury has existed for a long time, and without
serious challenge, despite the absence of such features which are often regarded elsewhere as integral parts of jury trial. It is quite easy to perceive a
particular aspect of jury trial in one’s own jurisdiction as a matter of logical necessity or fundamental principle, rather than realising it is the product of mere
historical accident. The benefit of this type of collection is that it ought to allow the reader to avoid such ethnocentrism and to appreciate the full range of
the institution of trial by jury.

251. See id.

